PAGES 1 - 33 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACOUELINE SCOTT CORLEY MICHAEL GONZALES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFF, ) NO. 17-CV-02264-JSC VS. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; UBER USA, ) LLC; RAISER-CA, AND DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE; SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA DEFENDANTS. THURSDAY ) AUGUST 31, 2017

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND

RECORDING 9:10 A.M. - 9:48 A.M.

## **APPEARANCES:**

FOR PLAINTIFF ZIMMERMAN REED LLP

2381 ROSECRANS AVENUE, SUITE 328 MANHATTAN BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90245

BY: CALEB MARKER, ESQUIRE

AUDET AND PARTNERS

711 VAN NESS AVENUE, SUITE 500 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102

BY: MARK E. BURTON, JR.

(FURTHER APPEARANCES ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

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RETIRED OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, USDC

## APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):

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BY: JOHN K. SHERK, III, ESQUIRE

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BY: PATRICK L. OOT, JR., ESQUIRE

1	THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 2017 9:10 A.M.
2	(TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: DUE AT TIMES TO COUNSELS' FAILURE TO
3	IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHEN SPEAKING, CERTAIN SPEAKER
4	ATTRIBUTIONS ARE BASED ON EDUCATED GUESS.)
5	000
6	PROCEEDINGS
7	THE CLERK: CALLING CIVIL ACTION C 17-2246, GONZALES
8	VERSUS UBER.
9	COUNSEL, PLEASE COME UP TO THE PODIUM. PLEASE STATE
10	YOUR APPEARANCE.
11	MR. BURTON: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. MARK BURTON
12	FOR PLAINTIFF.
13	MR. MARKER: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. CALEB MARKER
14	FOR PLAINTIFF.
15	THE COURT: GOOD MORNING.
16	MR. SHERK: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. JOHN SHERK,
17	SHOOK, HARDY & BACON FOR UBER.
18	THE COURT: GOOD MORNING.
19	MR. OOT: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. PATRICK OOT FROM
20	SHOOK, HARDY, BACON FOR THE UBER DEFENDANTS.
21	THE COURT: GOOD MORNING.
22	MS. LEE: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. ELIZABETH LEE,
23	SHOOK, HARDY & BACON FOR DEFENDANT.
24	THE COURT: GOOD MORNING.
25	OKAY. SO THIS IS ON FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS, AND MY

FIRST QUESTION FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IS, IF YOU COULD JUST TELL ME 1 EXACTLY WHAT IS THE COMMUNICATION THAT WAS INTERCEPTED. 2 3 MR. BURTON: SURE, YOUR HONOR. FIRST OF ALL, 4 REMEMBER THE IMPORTANT PART OF THE COMMUNICATION THAT WAS BEING 5 SENT WAS IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE DRIVER I.D. OKAY? SO THE 6 DRIVER I.D. ALLOWED UBER TO ACTUALLY KNOW WHERE A PARTICULAR 7 DRIVER WAS FOR LYFT. AND THEN --8 THE COURT: BUT HOW? THIS IS WHAT I NEED TO KNOW, 9 IS -- I'M LOOKING AT YOUR COMPLAINT, BECAUSE YOU ACTUALLY DIDN'T DRAFT A COMPLAINT, YOU JUST COPIED AN ARTICLE AND PUT 10 11 SOME STATUTES, WHICH IS THE PROBLEM, I THINK, HERE. THERE'S NO 12 ALLEGATIONS THAT ARE TIED TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE STATUTE BECAUSE YOU JUST QUOTED FROM AN ARTICLE. 1.3 SO TELL ME WHERE IN THE COMPLAINT YOU IDENTIFY --14 15 LIKE, WHAT IS THE COMMUNICATION? I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT IS. TS 16 IT FROM THE DRIVER TO LYFT, FROM LYFT TO UBER? WHAT IS THE 17 COMMUNICATION, FROM TO WHOM, WHERE IS IT HAPPENING, AND WHERE IS IT IN THE COMPLAINT? 18 19 MR. BURTON: WELL, THERE'S NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 20 DRIVER AND LYFT. OKAY? LYFT IS THE SAME AS THE DRIVER HERE, 21 LYFT IS THE AGENT OF THE DRIVER COMMUNICATING OUT A SIGNAL TO 22 POTENTIAL PASSENGERS FOR THAT DRIVER. 23 THE COURT: SO THE SIGNAL GOES DIRECTLY FROM THE 24 DRIVER TO THE POTENTIAL PASSENGER? 25 MR. BURTON: WELL, ESSENTIALLY, YOUR HONOR.

1	MIGHT TRAVEL THROUGH DIFFERENT ROUTES, BUT IT'S STILL COMING
2	FROM THE DRIVER TO THE PASSENGERS.
3	THE COURT: EVENTUALLY?
4	MR. BURTON: ABSOLUTELY.
5	THE COURT: OKAY. SO WHERE WHERE IS THAT, THOUGH?
6	MR. BURTON: IN REAL TIME, THIS ISN'T LIKE
7	(SIMULTANEOUS COLLOQUY).
8	THE COURT: NEARLY. NEARLY REAL TIME.
9	MR. BURTON: WELL
10	THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S WHAT YOU ALLEGE. THE
11	PROBLEM IS ALL YOU DID WAS TAKE SOMEBODY ELSE'S WORDS AND USE
12	THEM AS YOUR ALLEGATIONS.
13	MR. BURTON: WELL, UNDERSTOOD, YOUR HONOR. I MEAN,
14	OBVIOUSLY, THAT IS A COVERT OPERATION THAT UBER WAS CONDUCTING.
15	SO WE HAVE A VERY LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF EXACTLY HOW THEY DID
16	IT.
17	THE COURT: I MEAN, OBVIOUSLY, I ASSUME BEFORE YOU
18	FILED THE LAWSUIT YOU DID SOME INDEPENDENT RESEARCH YOURSELF
19	AND JUST DIDN'T RELY ON THE NEWSPAPER. SO OBVIOUSLY THAT'S
20	WHAT RULE 11 REQUIRES. RIGHT? SO OTHERWISE ANYONE COULD FILE
21	THE LAWSUIT.
22	SO BUT WHERE IS THE ALLEGATION? I THINK THAT'S
23	THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM HERE, RIGHT, IS I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT
24	THE COMMUNICATION IS. WHETHER IT'S ALLEGED ON INFORMATION OR
25	BELIEF OR WHATEVER IT IS YOU BELIEVE HAPPENED, JUST POINT ME TO

1	THE PARAGRAPH IN THE COMPLAINT
2	MR. BURTON: OKAY.
3	THE COURT: SO I CAN IDENTIFY THE COMMUNICATION.
4	MR. BURTON: THE COMMUNICATION IS THE DRIVER I.D.
5	WHICH SIMPLY SAID
6	THE COURT: NO. THAT'S THE DATA, RIGHT, IS THE
7	DRIVER I.D.
8	MR. BURTON: RIGHT
9	THE COURT: THE INFORMATION
10	MR. BURTON: THAT'S STILL A COMMUNICATION AS WELL.
11	THE COURT: WHERE IS IT GOING FROM AND TO WHOM?
12	MR. BURTON: WELL, IT'S TRAVELING IN SEVERAL
13	DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS BETWEEN ALL THE WAY FROM THE DRIVER,
14	ALL THE WAY TO POTENTIAL PASSENGERS.
15	THE COURT: OKAY. AND HOW DOES IT GET THERE?
16	MR. BURTON: WELL, I CAN'T EXACTLY EXPLAIN
17	TECHNOLOGY-WISE HOW THAT OCCURS, BUT THE DATA IS TRAVELING THIS
18	NETWORK, THE LYFT NETWORK, FROM THE DRIVER TO POTENTIAL
19	PASSENGERS, AND THE ENTIRE CONCEPT HERE IS THAT UBER CAME IN
20	AND INTERCEPTED THAT DATA. THIS WASN'T
21	THE COURT: WHERE? AT WHAT POINT DID THE
22	INTERCEPTION OCCUR?
23	MR. BURTON: WELL, IT'S OCCURRING NOT JUST AT ANY ONE
24	GIVEN POINT, YOUR HONOR; IT'S CONSTANT. IN OTHER WORDS, WE
25	BELIEVE WE BELIEVE THAT IT'S OUR SEPARATE FROM THE

1	ARTICLES, WE NOW HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WE BELIEVE THAT
2	THEY'RE TRACKING THIS DATA EVERY THREE SECONDS AT LEAST.
3	THE COURT: IT'S NOT IN THE COMPLAINT.
4	MR. BURTON: WELL, I UNDERSTAND THAT, YOUR HONOR.
5	BUT WE'RE FIGURING THIS OUT BECAUSE
6	THE COURT: THAT'S OKAY. I MEAN, I WOULD GIVE YOU
7	LEAVE TO AMEND.
8	MR. BURTON: SURE.
9	THE COURT: BUT WHAT I'M TRYING TO DO IS FIGURE
10	OUT I MEAN, YOU DEFENDED THE COMPLAINT. YOU COULD HAVE
11	DECIDED TO AMEND IT, AND INSTEAD YOU DEFENDED IT.
12	MR. BURTON: ABSOLUTELY, BECAUSE I THINK WE HAVE THE
13	ESSENTIALS THAT WE NEED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH
14	THE COURT: POINT ME TO WHERE. SEE, THE PROBLEM WHAT
15	I HAVE IS I'M TRYING TO FIGURE OUT SO THE STATUTE 2520
16	REQUIRES THERE TO BE AN INTERCEPTION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
17	COMMUNICATION, RIGHT?
18	MR. BURTON: RIGHT.
19	THE COURT: THE PLAINTIFF'S COMMUNICATION.
20	MR. BURTON: RIGHT.
21	THE COURT: AND SO I'M JUST TRYING TO FIGURE OUT IN
22	YOUR COMPLAINT WHAT WAS THE PLAINTIFF'S COMMUNICATION? AND
23	THERE MAY BE I DON'T KNOW IF THERE IS, I'LL HEAR FROM THE
24	DEFENSE, OBVIOUSLY A DISTINCTION IF IT'S COMMUNICATION FROM
25	LYFT THAT WAS ACTUALLY INTERCEPTED. LIKE, YOU SAY THEY'RE ALL

I DON'T KNOW. THEY MIGHT SAY THEY'RE TWO SEPARATE 1 ONE. THINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT MAY GO FROM THE DRIVER TO LYFT TO 2 3 UBER. THAT MAY HAVE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OR NOT. I DON'T KNOW, 4 BUT I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHERE, YOU KNOW, THE COMMUNICATION WENT. 5 MR. BURTON: WELL, REMEMBER -- WELL, WE'VE ALREADY 6 SAID HERE -- LET ME TRY TO FIND WHERE PRECISELY. 7 BUT, IN OTHER WORDS, WE'VE SAID THE DRIVER IS 8 COMMUNICATING THEIR LOCATION AND THEIR DRIVER I.D. OUT THROUGH 9 THE LYFT APPLICATION. OKAY? AND UBER IS ACCEPTING -- IS INTERCEPTING THAT COMMUNICATION OF THEIR I.D. AND THEIR 10 11 LOCATION AS -- IN REAL TIME AS THEY'RE GOING AROUND DRIVING 12 AROUND. THEY HAVE ALL THESE INTERCEPTED LOCATIONS GOING ON. SO DRIVER DATA IS GOING OUT --1.3 14 THE COURT: TO? 15 MR. BURTON: TO POTENTIAL PASSENGERS THROUGH THE LYFT SYSTEM. OKAY? JUST BECAUSE IT GOES THROUGH LYFT'S 16 17 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DOESN'T CHANGE THE FACT THAT IT'S STILL A COMMUNICATION THAT THEY'RE MAKING TO OTHER PEOPLE. THIS IS 18 19 IMPORTANT DATA THAT THEY'RE TRYING TO RELAY. 20 THE COURT: LET ME -- WHOEVER IS GOING TO ARGUE, I'D 21 LIKE TO HEAR, BECAUSE IT'S IMPORTANT, IF THEY'RE GOING TO LEAVE 22 TO AMEND, WE UNDERSTAND THIS. 23 WHAT IS YOUR PERCEPTION ON THE INTERACTION? 24 MR. OOT: EXACTLY WHERE YOU'RE GETTING AT, YOUR 25 HONOR, VERY SIMILAR TO THE FACEBOOK CASE WE REFERENCED IN OUR

PAPERS, THAT THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT COMMUNICATION, AND THERE'S 1 NO INTERCEPTION WITH EITHER OF THOSE COMMUNICATIONS. SO YOU 2 3 HAVE THE LYFT DRIVER APP TO THE LYFT SERVERS AND THE LYFT USER 4 APPEARS TO LYFT SERVERS. 5 AND GOING BACK TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, YOU CAN GO 6 TO PARAGRAPH 61 WHERE PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE THAT UBER INTERCEPTED 7 ITS ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS. BUT THEN YOU GO BACK TO THE 8 ARTICLE, ON PAGE 9 IT STATES THAT UBER ALLEGEDLY USED COMMONLY 9 AVAILABLE SOFTWARE TO FOOL LYFT'S SYSTEMS. SO THOSE ARE TWO DIFFERENT COMMUNICATIONS BY THEIR OWN ALLEGATIONS, AND THERE'S 10 11 NO INTERCEPTIONS BETWEEN EITHER OF THEM. 12 THE COURT: SEE, THAT'S THE PROBLEM. I DON'T --THAT -- I DON'T KNOW. YOU SAY THROUGH THIS SYSTEM -- BUT IN 1.3 14 THE FACEBOOK, RIGHT, CASE JUDGE DAVILA SAID THERE WAS A 15 DISTINCTION BECAUSE WHEN YOU HIT THE LIGHT AND IT WENT TO FACEBOOK AND IT SKIPPED CNN, AND THEY WEREN'T A PARTY TO THE 16 17 COMMUNICATION ANYMORE, SO THERE WASN'T AN INTERCEPTION. MR. OOT: NO, BUT IN FACEBOOK, THEY SAID THEY WERE A 18 19 PARTY TO COMMUNICATION. 20 THE COURT: THAT FACEBOOK WAS. 21 MR. OOT: RIGHT. 22 THE COURT: RIGHT. 23 MR. OOT: AND THAT'S WHY THEY DIDN'T QUALIFY AS AN 24 INTERCEPTION, THAT THE STATUTE DIDN'T APPLY AT ALL. 25 THE COURT: RIGHT.

MR. OOT: FACEBOOK SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THEY 1 2 WERE --3 THE COURT: BUT ARE YOU SAYING THE DRIVER IS ACTUALLY 4 NOT A PARTY TO THE COMMUNICATION BECAUSE THE DRIVER'S COMMUNICATION GOES TO LYFT? 5 6 MR. OOT: NO, YOUR HONOR. AND, ACTUALLY, WE MADE A 7 OUICK DEMONSTRATIVE THAT I PASSED UP AS SLIDES. I'M HAPPY TO USE IT OR HAPPY TO SKIP IT, BUT IT MIGHT HELP DESCRIBE WHAT 8 9 WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE. BUT IF YOU TURN TO PAGE 3, THAT HAS 10 THE TWO DIFFERENT SLIDES. 11 THE COURT: YOU CAN PUT IT UP BECAUSE WE HAVE GUESTS. MR. OOT: WE COULDN'T --12 THE COURT: OH, IT'S NOT WORKING. OKAY. 1.3 14 BUT, ESSENTIALLY, YOU KNOW, WHAT WE HAVE MR. OOT: 15 ABOVE IS THE VERY TRANSACTION THAT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT EARLIER WITH THE FACEBOOK CASE WHERE THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT 16 17 LINES OF COMMUNICATION BACK TO THE USER. HERE WHAT WE HAVE IS TWO DISTINCT LINES OF 18 19 COMMUNICATION, AGAIN, BETWEEN THE USER APP AND LYFT AND THE 20 DRIVER APP AND LYFT, AND THERE'S NO INTERCEPTION BETWEEN EITHER 21 OF THEM BECAUSE THE DRIVER IS THE PARTY WITH THE COMMUNICATION 22 WITH THE LYFT SERVERS, AND THE LYFT APP IS THE COMMUNICATION 23 BETWEEN LYFT AND THE LYFT SERVERS. 24 THE COURT: SO YOU'RE THINKING THE DRIVER ACTUALLY 25 NEVER COMMUNICATES DIRECTLY WITH THE PASSENGER, EVERYTHING GOES

THROUGH LYFT. 1 2 MR. OOT: EVERYTHING GOES THROUGH LYFT, YES, YOUR 3 HONOR. 4 MR. BURTON: THAT'S A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A 5 DIFFERENCE, YOUR HONOR. IF I AM USING GMAIL TO SEND MY 6 COMMUNICATION AND -- OUT TO SOMEBODY ELSE AND THEY ACCEPT --7 THEY GRAB MY COMMUNICATION AS IT'S GOING FROM THE GMAIL SERVER 8 THROUGH TO MY INTENDED RECIPIENT, THEY STILL INTERCEPTED MY 9 COMMUNICATION THAT I'VE INTENDED FOR THE EVENTUAL RECIPIENT. 10 THE COURT: WHAT CASE IS THAT? 11 MR. BURTON: WELL, I DON'T THINK THERE'S A CASE THAT 12 DOESN'T SAY IT. IN OTHER WORDS, MY PHONE CALL MIGHT GET ROUTED -- I PICK UP THE PHONE. I CALL YOU. THAT MIGHT GET 1.3 14 ROUTED THROUGH AT&T'S LINK SOMEWHERE, AND THEN IT GOES OUT TO 15 MY INTENDED PERSON THAT I'M TALKING TO ON THE PHONE. 16 THEY TAP INTO THAT BETWEEN AT&T'S COMMUNICATION CENTER AND THE 17 PERSON THAT I'M TALKING TO DOESN'T CHANGE THE FACT THAT THEY'RE INTERCEPTING MY --18 19 THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THAT? I THOUGHT ABOUT THAT. 20 IN FACT, MOST PEOPLE NOW HAVE INTERNET PHONES, SO IT ALL GOES 21 THROUGH SERVERS; I DON'T KNOW WHY GOING THROUGH A SERVER MAKES 22 IT DIFFERENT. 23 YES, YOUR HONOR. AND PLAINTIFFS HAVE CITED MR. OOT: 24 THOSE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION PROVIDER CASES WHERE THERE WAS 25 AN ACTUAL INTERCEPTION IN BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNICATIONS. SO,

FOR EXAMPLE, THE CAMPBELL CASE WHERE FACEBOOK WAS ACCESSING THE 1 FACEBOOK MESSAGES BETWEEN USERS FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES. 2 3 SO THAT WOULD BE THE COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDER 4 ACCESSING, AGAIN, IN THE MIDDLE WHERE THEY SHOULDN'T BE. 5 BECAUSE WE HAVE THESE TWO DIFFERENT DISTINCT LINES OF 6 COMMUNICATION, THERE'S NO INTERCEPTION. 7 SO I THINK WHAT PLAINTIFF IS TRYING TO SAY IS, WELL, THESE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER CASES OR THESE ELECTRONIC 8 9 COMMUNICATION PROVIDER CASES WHERE THERE ACTUALLY IS INTERCEPTION HAPPENING HERE, BUT THERE'S NOT BECAUSE OF THE TWO 10 11 DISTINCT LINES JUST LIKE THE FACEBOOK CASE THAT WE CITED IN OUR 12 PAPERS. THE COURT: WELL, THERE -- FACEBOOK IS NOT EXACTLY ON 1.3 14 POINT, BECAUSE THERE WASN'T -- IT WAS THAT THE USER WAS 15 COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY WITH FACEBOOK, AND IT WAS BYPASSING -- I 16 GUESS IT WAS CNN IN THAT CASE, THE WEBPAGE, RIGHT? 17 MR. OOT: SO IN THE FACEBOOK CASE, IT WAS -- THE GET COMMAND WENT OUT TO -- FIRST TO CNN AND THEN CAME BACK TO THE 18 19 USER, AND THEN SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATION WENT TO -- FROM THE 20 USER TO THE --21 THE COURT: DIRECTLY TO FACEBOOK. 22 MR. OOT: DIRECTLY TO FACEBOOK. 23 THE COURT: NOT THROUGH CNN. 24 MR. OOT: NOT THROUGH CNN, BUT VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT 25 HAPPENS HERE.

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SO WE HAVE A USER APP WHERE THE USER APP COMMUNICATES TO LYFT SERVERS THAT: LET ME SEE WHAT'S OUT THERE, WHAT'S AVAILABLE, WHAT'S THE BROADCAST INFORMATION. AND THEN YOU HAVE THE SEPARATE COMMUNICATION WITH THE DRIVER THAT CONTAINS THAT LYFT I.D. AND PUBLICLY BROADCAST INFORMATION. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, WE ACTUALLY DON'T KNOW, BECAUSE NONE OF THAT IS IN THE COMPLAINT. MR. BURTON: WELL, I DON'T THINK THAT MUCH DETAIL NEEDS TO BE IN THE COMPLAINT, YOUR HONOR. WE'VE SAID THAT THEY ARE SENDING THESE COMMUNICATIONS OUT TO -- NOT ONLY TO LYFT BUT USING THE LYFT SYSTEM. WE SAID THEY SET UP THESE FALSE SITES, FALSELY SET UP FALSE --THE COURT: BUT THAT'S NOT WIRETAP ACT. RIGHT? YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO IT THAT WAY. I UNDERSTAND YOU WANT TO SAY THE SCHEME IS WRONG AND BAD. I GET THAT. THAT'S OKAY. LYFT WAS SITTING HERE, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE AN EASY CASE. IT WOULD BE A LOT OF DIFFERENT STATUTES THEY COULD BRING UP UNDER, RIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION BECAUSE IT VIOLATED LYFT, BUT LYFT'S THIS IS DRIVER --NOT HERE. MR. BURTON: YOU HAVE TO REMEMBER LYFT IS ACTING AS THE AGENT OF THE DRIVERS. SO THERE'S NOT REALLY A HUGE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DRIVERS AND LYFT IN THIS PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE AS FAR AS THE INTERCEPTION OF THE DATA IS CONCERNED.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, I DON'T KNOW ABOUT

1	THAT. I GUESS BUT WHAT YOU JUST SAID, WHERE IN THE
2	COMPLAINT JUST TELL ME WHERE IN THE COMPLAINT
3	MR. BURTON: WELL, I'M TRYING TO POINT TO PARAGRAPH
4	75 AND SOME OF THESE DIFFERENT PLACES WHERE WE'RE DESCRIBING
5	THE DRIVER IDENTIFICATION AND PRICING INFORMATION BEING
6	INTERCEPTED AS IT'S SENT OUT, INTERCEPTING
7	PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
8	THE COURT: BUT YOU DID THAT'S JUST A CONCLUSION.
9	THAT'S NOT TELLING ME WHERE THEY INTERCEPTED IT OR HOW THEY
10	INTERCEPTED IT, JUST THAT THEY INTERCEPTED IT.
11	SO LET'S GO TO I MEAN, YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO
12	AMEND THE COMPLAINT. YOU ACTUALLY NEED TO DRAFT A COMPLAINT
13	WITH ALLEGATIONS AND NOT JUST QUOTE FROM SOMEBODY'S ARTICLE.
14	ALL RIGHT? YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO DO THAT WORK.
15	BUT LET'S TALK ABOUT CONTENT, THOUGH, AND YOUR
16	ARGUMENT WAS, WHICH HAS SOME APPEAL, IS THAT BECAUSE YOU
17	AGREE UNDER THE LAW THAT I.D., RIGHT, ISN'T CONTENT, OR DO YOU
18	AGREE?
19	MR. BURTON: NO. I MEAN, I BELIEVE THE I.D. IS
20	CONTENT ITSELF.
21	THE COURT: AND WHAT CASE SAYS THAT?
22	MR. BURTON: WELL, OBVIOUSLY, WE DON'T HAVE A CASE
23	THAT IS CONSIDERED THIS EXACT
24	THE COURT: NO, I UNDERSTAND, BUT THE CASE LAW SAYS
25	THAT THE INFORMATION THAT GOES ALONG WITH THE COMMUNICATION,

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THE IDENTIFYING, THE PHONE NUMBER AND THOSE KIND OF THINGS, ARE NOT CONTENT. AND SO I WOULD THINK THAT THE DRIVER I.D. MIGHT BE SOMETHING LIKE THAT. I DON'T KNOW. SO THAT'S WHY I'M WONDERING WHAT CASE YOU'RE RELYING ON TO SAY THAT IT FITS INTO THE CONTENT SIDE AS OPPOSED TO THE IDENTIFYING SIDE.

MR. BURTON: SURE. WELL, THE -- THIS ISN'T JUST

IDENTIFIED -- OBVIOUSLY, THERE'S A CELLPHONE NUMBER, IF YOU

WILL, OR OTHER INFORMATION THAT'S TRACKED REGARDING THIS. BUT

THE I.D. ITSELF IS A PARTICULAR COMMUNICATION THAT ALLOWS THIS

IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT WHERE THE DRIVER IS LOCATED TO BE

COMMUNICATED. AND THAT'S PART OF THE COMMUNICATION, IS THAT

YOU'RE SAYING NOT ONLY IS THIS MY UNIQUE I.D. -- WHICH CAN

CHANGE OVER TIME AS WELL. SO THIS ISN'T JUST SOME -- THIS IS

PART OF THE -- NECESSARY PART OF THE COMMUNICATION ORDER FOR

THEM TO SEND A MESSAGE BETWEEN TWO POINTS, AND IT'S IRRELEVANT

DATA THAT DOESN'T COMMUNICATE ANYTHING. IT COMMUNICATES VERY

IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT LOCATION.

THE COURT: THE LOCATION INFORMATION ITSELF IS NOT CONTENT, RIGHT? THE CASE LAW IS PRETTY SPECIFIC ABOUT THAT.

MR. BURTON: WELL, I THINK THAT ONCE YOU -- IN THIS

PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE, THE FACT THAT THEY CAN DERIVE

INFORMATION FROM THAT COMMUNICATION, THEY CAN -- THEY CAN -- ON

THE GPS THEY CAN SEE, OH, WHERE YOU ARE, WHERE YOU DRIVE, WHERE

THE DRIVERS ARE CONCENTRATED, THE LOCATIONS THAT THEY ACTUALLY

PICK UP PASSENGERS.

THE COURT: YES, YES. 1 MR. BURTON: WHERE THEY START --2 THE COURT: YES. 3 MR. BURTON: -- THEIR DAY POTENTIALLY. THAT DOES 4 COMMUNICATE INFORMATION. 5 6 (SIMULTANEOUS COLLOQUY.) 7 THE COURT: OKAY, BUT LET ME ASK YOU SOMETHING BECAUSE I MIGHT HAVE AN INSIGHT INTO. THAT'S ALL GPS LOCATION 8 9 INFORMATION, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SEEKS THAT INFORMATION IN 10 WE ISSUE SEARCH WARRANTS FOR IT BASED ON PROBABLE 11 CAUSE. WE DO NOT REQUIRE IT TO GO THROUGH THE WIRETAP STATUTE. 12 WE DO NOT. WE DO NOT. MR. BURTON: OKAY. 1.3 THE COURT: SO THAT WOULD -- IF I WERE TO RULE THAT 14 15 JUST COMMUNICATING LOCATION INFORMATION IS CONTACT THAT FALLS WITHIN THE WIRETAP STATUTE, I'M TELLING YOU THE WAY EVERY COURT 16 17 IN THE UNITED STATES OPERATES, IN TERMS OF SEARCH WARRANTS, WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE BECAUSE NO COURT HAS HELD THAT THAT FALLS 18 19 WITHIN THE WIRETAP STATUTE. 20 SO I'M JUST -- I'M TELLING YOU THERE'S A LINE HERE 21 THAT I'M AWARE OF, WHICH IS THE IMPLICATIONS TO THE ARGUMENT 22 THAT GO BEYOND. IT'S NOT SIMPLE -- WE DON'T ACTUALLY JUST HAVE 23 A CIVIL STATUTE. IT'S ACTUALLY IN THE CRIMINAL CODE, THE 2.4 WIRETAP STATUTE. 25 MR. BURTON: I UNDERSTAND.

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THE COURT: SO THAT APPLIES. THAT'S CERTAINLY NOT THE UNDERSTANDING AT ALL. I SEE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, BUT THERE'S LOTS OF IDENTIFYING INFORMATION THAT COMMUNICATES VALUABLE INFORMATION OF WHICH CAN BE SUBSTANTIVE. BUT THAT'S NOT WHAT THE WIRETAP STATUTE SAYS, AND WHEN IT WAS PASSED IT WAS TALKING ABOUT CONTENT, REALLY, WORDS, RIGHT, INTERCEPTING. MR. BURTON: RIGHT, WELL, ELECTRONICALLY EVERYTHING ISN'T ACTUAL WORDS. IT MIGHT BE CONVERTED TO WORDS EVENTUALLY, BUT I THINK IT'S BROAD ENOUGH -- OBVIOUSLY, IT WASN'T MEANT JUST TO COMMUNICATE SPOKEN WORDS, WE'VE ALL AGREED ABOUT THAT. THE COURT: AN EMOJI, I THINK -- WOULDN'T YOU AGREE IF THEY INTERCEPTED YOUR EMOJI THAT WOULD BE CONTENT? MR. OOT: I WOULD AGREE, YOUR HONOR, THAT PARTICULAR COMMUNICATION MIGHT BE CONTENT. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. BURTON: WELL, THIS IS LOT MORE COMMUNICATIVE THAN AN EMOJI. YOU KNOW, THESE SPECIFIC I.D. NUMBERS THAT WERE HIDDEN THAT ALLOWED, YOU KNOW, THIS VERY SPECIFIC DATA -- I MEAN, YOU GOT TO REMEMBER, THE INTENT OF THE STATUE HERE IS TO PREVENT EXACTLY WHAT OCCURRED HERE. CORPORATE ESPIONAGE IS SOMETHING THAT --THE COURT: I'M GOING TO STOP YOU FOR A SECOND. THE INTENT OF THE STATUTE IS TO PROHIBIT THE INTERCEPTION OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS --MR. BURTON: RIGHT.

THE COURT: -- AND THE CONTENT OF THEM. BUT THERE'S 1 A DATA AND INFORMATION THAT'S OUT THERE THAT'S PUBLICLY 2 3 ACCESSIBLE, AND IT'S NOT. 4 WHAT THIS CASE IS, REALLY WHAT IT IS, IS THE LINE 5 BETWEEN THAT, AND THAT WILL GET PROBABLY WHETHER IT'S PUBLICLY 6 ACCESSIBLE OR NOT, RIGHT, AND IT'S SOMEWHERE ON THE LINE. 7 WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO DECIDE WHERE IT FALLS ON THE LINE. CERTAINLY, IF THEY WERE INTERCEPTING THE PHONE CALLS 8 9 OR THE TEXTS BETWEEN THE DRIVERS AND LYFT OR THE PASSENGERS, 10 WE'D HAVE NO DISPUTE. 11 THIS IS SOMEWHERE DIFFERENT. THIS IS AUTOMATIC 12 INFORMATION AND DATA THAT'S BEING CONVEYED ONCE THE DRIVER HAS THE APP ON. THAT'S WHAT'S BEING INTERCEPTED, RIGHT? 1.3 14 MR. BURTON: WELL, THAT IN PART IS TRUE, BUT JUST 15 BECAUSE IT'S AN AUTOMATIC COMMUNICATION THE PARTIES HAVE SET UP DOESN'T MAKE IT ANY LESS OF A COMMUNICATION. 16 17 THE COURT: TRUE. BUT THE -- THE TERM THAT WE'RE DISCUSSING HERE IS CONTENT, IS IT THE CONTENT OF THE 18 19 COMMUNICATION, OR IS IT MERELY DATA ABOUT THE COMMUNICATION, 20 BECAUSE THE WIRETAP ACT PROHIBITS THE INTERCEPTION OF THE 21 CONTENT BUT NOT THE DATA ABOUT THE COMMUNICATION. 22 MR. BURTON: RIGHT. BUT THE IDEA OF THE DRIVER IS 23 NOT MERELY -- THE DATA ABOUT THE COMMUNICATION IS USUALLY 2.4 PRODUCED FOR THE NEEDS OF COMMUNICATING THE DATA. IN OTHER 25 WORDS, THERE ARE CERTAIN DATA THAT GETS GENERATED

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AUTOMATICALLY, NOT BY THE PARTIES ALL THEMSELVES, BUT USUALLY BY A THIRD-PARTY PROVIDER. IT MIGHT BE THE ACTUAL CELLULAR CARRIER, FOR INSTANCE, BETWEEN DRIVER AND LYFT OR ONE OF THE OTHER PARTIES. AND THAT DATA REGARDING THAT COMMUNICATION IS COMPLETELY SEPARATE FROM WHAT IS BEING CONVEYED FROM THE DRIVER THROUGH THE LYFT SYSTEM. THE COURT: HOW IS A DRIVER'S I.D. DATA OR I.D. NUMBER ANY DIFFERENT FROM A DRIVER'S NAME? MR. BURTON: HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM A NAME? THE COURT: IT'S NOT, RIGHT? IT'S ANOTHER WAY OF IDENTIFYING A PERSON BY NAME. CORRECT ME IF I'M WRONG, DON'T THE CASES SAY THAT THE NAME OF THE PERSON TO COMMUNICATION IS NOT CONTENT. MR. OOT: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. IT'S ACTUALLY NAME, ADDRESS, IDENTITY OF THE PERSON MAKING THE COMMUNICATION. THAT'S THE FACEBOOK INTERNET TRACKING CASE CITING ZYNGA, ALL SAY THAT'S NOT THE CONTENT OF THE STATUTE. MR. BURTON: BECAUSE THIS IS -- IT MIGHT BE IDENTIFYING YOURSELF AS THE NAME, BUT IT'S OBVIOUSLY NOT YOUR NAME, AND IT'S OBVIOUSLY NOT BEING USED MERELY TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF. THE ENTIRE POINT OF THAT COMMUNICATION IS TO COMMUNICATE YOUR LOCATION. OKAY? SO WHILE YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DRIVER EVENTUALLY THROUGH THE USE OF THAT DATA, THERE'S A LOT OF -- YOU KNOW, INFORMATION THAT PEOPLE CAN COMMUNICATE THAT

CAN IDENTIFY YOU. 1 BUT -- SO, FOR INSTANCE, IF I SEND MY SOCIAL SECURITY 2 3 NUMBER THROUGH AN EMAIL, SOMEBODY INTERCEPTS IT, AND THEY GET 4 THAT COMMUNICATION, THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY MY NAME 5 SOMEHOW, BUT STILL THEY INTERCEPTED MY COMMUNICATION, THAT 6 SPECIFIC INFORMATION. AND IT WASN'T THE INTENT OF THE DRIVERS 7 TO SEND THE -- OR OF ANY OF THIS COMMUNICATION TO IDENTIFY THE 8 PERSON'S NAME. 9 IN OTHER WORDS, WHEN THE INFORMATION IS SENT, THEY'RE NOT DOING IT SO THAT THEY KNOW WHO IT IS OR SO THAT YOU KNOW 10 11 WHO SENT THE COMMUNICATION. YOU'RE DOING IT TO CONVEY 12 INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR LOCATION THROUGH THE SPECIFIC CODES. NOW THAT'S CONTENT AS OPPOSED TO, OH, THIS IS COMING FROM THIS 1.3 14 PARTICULAR DRIVER. 15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO THE PLAINTIFF'S POSITION IS THAT THE I.D. DRIVER NUMBER IS THE CONTENT THAT'S BEING 16 17 CONVEYED? MR. BURTON: ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR. 18 19 THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE? 20 MR. BURTON: WELL, WE'RE ALSO SAYING THAT YOU CAN 21 IDENTIFY A LOT MORE ABOUT THE -- WHAT'S BEING COMMUNICATED 22 BASED UPON THAT DATA. IN OTHER WORDS, IF I USE A CODE TO SAY 23 THIS IS MY LOCATION, OR THIS IS WHAT I AM DOING RIGHT NOW, BUT 2.4 I'M USING A SHORTHAND OF SOME SORT, WHICH THIS ESSENTIALLY IS,

THEN I'M COMMUNICATING INFORMATION THAT GOES -- THAT CAN BE

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DERIVED BROADER THAN JUST THE MERE NUMBERS THEMSELVES.

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THE COURT: HOW IS THAT ANY DIFFERENT FROM A GPS
TRACKER? RIGHT? SO IF LAW ENFORCEMENT TRACKS THE GPS LOCATION
FROM MY CELLPHONE, IT'S GETTING ALL THE SAME DATA. IT KNOWS
EXACTLY WHERE I'M GOING, HOW LONG I'VE BEEN THERE, WHAT I'VE
DONE.

MR. BURTON: RIGHT, BUT THIS ISN'T A GPS TRACKER.

ONE OF THE THINGS YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO DERIVE FROM THE

INFORMATION IS LOCATION, BUT THAT'S IRRELEVANT TO WHETHER OR

NOT THIS IS AN ACTUAL GPS TRACKER.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT. I'M TALKING ABOUT

CONTENT, BECAUSE WE KNOW FROM THE CASE LAW THAT YOUR GPS

LOCATION IS NOT CONTENT. THAT'S WHAT THE CASE LAW HOLDS, AND

I'M TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW YOUR ARGUMENT IS ANY DIFFERENT

FROM THAT.

MR. BURTON: BECAUSE THIS IS CONTENT THAT ALLOWS YOU TO DETERMINE THE GPS LOCATION. THE GPS LOCATION MIGHT NOT BE CONTENT IF YOU'RE SENDING IT OUT, BUT IF YOU'RE SENDING INFORMATION THAT ALLOWS YOU TO GO AND DETERMINE THE LOCATION, THEN THAT IS CONTENT THAT YOU'VE SENT OUT. JUST BECAUSE YOU END UP AT A PLACE THAT WASN'T CONTENT DOESN'T MEAN THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THAT WASN'T CONTENT. IF I SEND AN EMAIL OR A TEXT SAYING I'M AT THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE RIGHT NOW, YOU GO, OH, WELL, I KNOW WHERE THAT IS, AND I CAN DETERMINE THE GPS COORDINATES BASED UPON YOUR DESCRIPTION OF

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WHERE YOU ARE. OKAY? THEY STILL INTERCEPTED MY CONTENT EVEN THOUGH THEY'VE NOW TRANSLATED THAT INTO WHERE I AM AND MIGHT DETERMINE GPS-WISE MY EXACT LOCATION, BUT I STILL COMMUNICATED CONTENT FOR THEM TO FIGURE OUT WHERE I AM. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO, YOUR HONOR, LET ME GIVE YOU AN ANALOGY. IF I PUT MY NAME OR WHATEVER IN THE OLD-FASHIONED PHONE BOOK AND SOMEBODY PICKS UP THE PHONE AND CALLS ME, I CAN'T LATER SAY THAT THAT NON-CONTENT INFORMATION IS PRIVATE. SO, THE CASE LAW IS ON POINT WITH THAT THIS LOCATION -- ANONYMOUS GEO LOCATION INFORMATION AND ANONYMOUS USER I.D. ARE NOT CONTENT. I THINK IT'S DIFFICULT TO CONTEST THAT. ANOTHER WAY TO THINK ABOUT THIS, YOUR HONOR, BACK WHEN I WAS AT THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND I HAD TO DO TRAINING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF WHAT'S CONTENT OR NOT CONTENT UNDER 2703, SO WHAT THE AGENCY COULD GET WITHOUT A WARRANT AND WHAT THEY ACTUALLY NEEDED TO GO TO DOJ FOR A WARRANT FOR. THERE WE FOUND AN ARTICLE BY PROFESSOR WARREN KERR, AND HE MADE UP A VERY GOOD ANALOGY WHERE HE TALKED ABOUT PLAIN OLD-FASHIONED POSTAL MAIL. SO THINGS THAT GO OUTSIDE THE ENVELOPE, LIKE NAME, ADDRESS, AND RETURN ADDRESS EVEN, THAT WOULD BE NON-CONTENT INFORMATION, BUT THE EMOJIS OR THE LETTER

TO YOUR MOTHER OR BROTHER, THE THINGS THAT GO INSIDE THE

ENVELOPE, THOSE WOULD ACTUALLY BE PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS.

BUT SO HERE WE'RE STILL TALKING ABOUT ANONYMOUS GEO 1 LOCATION INFORMATION, ANONYMOUS USER I.D., AND PLAINTIFFS 2 3 ALLEGING THINGS THAT AREN'T IN THE COMPLAINT THAT UBER COULD DO 4 ANOTHER STEP OR ANOTHER TWO STEPS TO TRY TO POTENTIALLY FIGURE 5 OUT WHERE THIS PERSON MIGHT BE OR WHO THIS PERSON MIGHT BE. 6 THE COURT: WELL, I KNOW -- IT'S NOT IN THE 7 COMPLAINT, AND I'LL GIVE THEM LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT. Ι THINK IT'S GOOD TO FLESH IT OUT WHEN WE DO HAVE ALLEGATIONS OF 8 9 THE COMPLAINT, THEN WE CAN HAVE A ROBUST ARGUMENT BASED ON THE 10 ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT. SO I UNDERSTAND. NONE OF THAT'S 11 IN THE COMPLAINT. 12 ALL RIGHT. WELL, I THINK THAT'S AN ISSUE, IT'S GOING TO BE -- THE CONTENT IS GOING TO BE A HURDLE HERE AND YOU'RE 1.3 14 GOING TO HAVE TO SHOW SOMETHING, RIGHT? 15 MR. BURTON: I UNDERSTAND, YOUR HONOR. I'D JUST LIKE 16 TO POINT OUT AS FAR AS THE STATE CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONCERNED, 17 THOUGH, I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY ISSUE THERE. I DON'T THINK THAT THAT -- THEY HAVEN'T REALLY ATTACKED IT BY SOMEHOW SAYING 18 19 THAT IF WE CALL UNDER THE WIRETAP ACT SOMEHOW THE STATE CAUSE OF ACTION ABOUT USING A DEVICE TO TRACK PEOPLE SOMEHOW --20 21 THE COURT: YOU MEAN THE --22 MR. BURTON: -- FAILS AT THE EXACT SAME TIME. 23 THE COURT: YOU MEAN A CIPA CLAIM? 24 MR. BURTON: YEAH. 25 THE COURT: OKAY. WHAT ABOUT THAT?

MR. OOT: THE CIPA ACT CLAIM FAILS, TOO, YOUR HONOR. 1 PLAINTIFF SITES TWO CASES WHERE THERE'S AN 2 3 INTERCEPTION WITH CALL CENTERS OF A VOICE PHONE CALL; ONE WAS 4 RECORDED, ONE WAS A SUPERVISOR OVERSEEING THE CALL OF A CALL 5 CENTER EMPLOYEE WITH A CUSTOMER DISCUSSING FINANCIAL 6 INFORMATION. THERE THE CONTENTS OF THE COMMUNICATION OR THE 7 FINANCIAL DISCUSSION, THAT WAS THE -- KIGHT V. CASHCALL CASE. THAT WAS PROTECTED CONTENT. AND THAT'S WHERE THE COURT MOVED 8 BEYOND THE MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THEY WEREN'T -- THEY WERE 9 10 DISCUSSING CONTENT, FINANCIAL INFORMATION OR CONFIDENTIAL 11 COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE CIPA STATUTE. 12 THE FAULKNER CASE, ANOTHER CASE THAT THEY REFERENCED, WHERE THEY'RE ALLEGING THE VOICE RECORDINGS OF THE CALL CENTER, 13 14 THERE, THE COURT RULED THAT THERE WAS A FAILED CLAIM UNDER 632, 15 AND VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT WE HAVE HERE, JUST BALD ALLEGATIONS OF RECITALS OF THE STATUTE. 16 17 SO WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE WITH, AGAIN, ANONYMOUS GEO LOCATION INFORMATION, ANONYMOUS USER I.D., WE 18 19 DON'T HAVE AN INTERCEPTION OF CONTENTS UNDER THE STATUE, OR IN 20 THE CIPA STATUTE IT'S CALLED CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION. SO 21 THERE ISN'T ANY CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS THERE. 22 MORE IMPORTANTLY, YOUR HONOR, I THINK WHAT'S MORE ON 23 POINT IS TO, AGAIN, FOCUS ON THE TYPE OF INFORMATION THAT WE'RE 2.4 DEALING WITH HERE.

AND THE CASE THAT WE CITE, THE COURT RULED THAT

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IT'S -- IF THE INFORMATION IS SHARED -- EXCUSE ME -- ARCHIVED, 1 2 PRINTED, OR SAVED, THAT COULD BE THE -- YOU KNOW, SOMETHING 3 THAT WOULD LEAD TO CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION, BUT THAT'S THE 4 YAHOO INSTANT MESSAGING CASE. 5 THERE A USER WAS COMMUNICATING WITH SOMEBODY OVER 6 YAHOO INSTANT MESSAGING, AND DIDN'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COMMUNICATION WAS, AND WAS MAKING A -- IT WAS 7 A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS MAKING THE CLAIM THAT 8 9 THAT COULD HAVE BEEN CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION UNDER THE CIPA 10 STATUTE, AND THE COURT RULED THERE THAT'S A NO-GO. 11 SO I THINK WE HAVE A VERY SIMILAR TYPE OF 12 COMMUNICATION HERE WHERE NON-CONTENT INFORMATION, ANONYMOUS USER I.D. AND ANONYMOUS GEO LOCATION INFORMATION DOESN'T EVEN 1.3 14 GIVE RISE TO THE TYPE OF INFORMATION THAT WAS IN THE YAHOO 15 MESSENGER CASE. 16 THE COURT: WHAT CALIFORNIA CASE WOULD I LOOK AT THAT 17 WOULD SHOW THAT THE I.D. AND THE LOCATION ARE PRIVATE? MR. BURTON: WELL, YOUR HONOR, YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT 18 19 THE ACTUAL CODE SECTION, BECAUSE THEY'RE TRYING TO LUMP ALL OF 20 CIPA INTO ONE OVERALL ARGUMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, THERE'S 21 DIFFERENT PROHIBITIONS ON OBTAINING PRIVATE INFORMATION WITHIN 22 CIPA, SEVERAL DIFFERENT SECTIONS. 23 THEY'RE CITING CASE LAW, NOT TALKING ABOUT 637.7 --24 IT'S TALKING ABOUT 632 AND OTHER PORTIONS OF CIPA. THEN 25 THEY'RE TRYING TO PIGGYBACK THOSE ON TO 637.7.

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637.7 IS VERY SPECIFIC. IT SAYS NO PERSON OR ENTITY IN THIS STATE SHALL USE AN ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICE TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OR MOVEMENT OF A PERSON, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT THEY DID. OKAY? THERE IS NO REOUIREMENT FOR THIS PORTION OF CIPA THAT THE INFORMATION IS SOMEHOW OTHERWISE PRIVATE OR A COMMUNICATION OR WHATEVER ELSE IT IS. THEY'RE CITING CASES --THE COURT: WE KNOW LOCATION IS PRIVATE, BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT EVEN REQUIRES, RIGHT, PROBABLY CAUSE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO REAL TIME TRACK LOCATIONS. SO THERE'S NO QUESTION THAT THE LOCATION IS PRIVATE INFORMATION. MR. OOT: SO I THINK YOU'RE REFERENCING THE JONES CASE, YOUR HONOR. IN THAT CASE YOU HAD AN ACTUAL TRESPASSING. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR DISCUSSED PUTTING A DEVICE ON A CAR ACTUALLY HAS AN ANALOGY TO A PHYSICAL TRESPASS, SO THAT WOULD GIVE RISE TO YET AN EXTRA LAYER OF PROTECTION THAT SOMEBODY WOULDN'T EXPECT, AND THAT'S THE TYPE OF PROTECTION --THE COURT: THEN YOU LOOK AT JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR'S CONCURRENCE, AND I THINK -- LOOK, I MEAN, I CAN TELL YOU -- YOU KNOW, YOU WERE IN THE GOVERNMENT. EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ATTORNEY, THEY COME HERE AND GET A WARRANT. THEY WOULD NEVER ACTUALLY TRY TO BRING A CASE, PROSECUTE IT, HAVING FOLLOWED IN REAL TIME WITH A GPS TRACKER THROUGH GETTING -- IN OTHER WORDS,

THE SUPREME COURT IS GOING TO DECIDE WHETHER HISTORICAL CELL

SITE INFORMATION REOUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE. MOST PEOPLE THINK

THEY'RE PROBABLY GOING TO SAY NO. THERE REALLY ISN'T ANY 1 DISPUTE, I THINK, THAT REAL TIME REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE, SO 2 3 THERE'S AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THAT'S PRIVATE. 4 MR. OOT: BUT THERE'S AN EXCEPTION HERE, YOUR HONOR. 5 WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT IS REAL TIME GPS LOCATION THAT'S 6 BROADCAST TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. SO IT'S NOT, YOU KNOW, 7 PERSONAL INFORMATION (INDISCERNIBLE) WITH THE JONES CASE AND WHAT THE SUPREME COURT WILL BE LOOKING AT THIS YEAR. 8 9 WE'RE TALKING ABOUT NON-CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION 10 WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY ON YOUR LICENSE, WORLDWIDE ROYALTY-FREE 11 LICENSE TO BROADCAST IN PERPETUITY MULTIPLE PLATFORMS TO SEND 12 ANYWHERE. SO TO SAY THAT I LATER HAVE A CIPA CLAIM OR PRIVACY 1.3 14 INTEREST FOR INFORMATION THAT I'M SENDING OUT TO THE WORLD OR 15 ESSENTIALLY PUTTING ON A BILLBOARD I DON'T THINK IS --16 (SIMULTANEOUS COLLOQUY.) 17 THE COURT: WELL, YOU'RE SENDING OUT TO PEOPLE WHO ARE LEGITIMATELY ON THE LYFT APP. 18 19 MR. OOT: WELL -- BUT THE DIFFERENCE, YOUR HONOR, THE 20 TWO CASES THAT TOUCH ON THIS ARE IN OUR FAVOR. THAT'S SNOW V. 21 DIRECTV CASE AND THE KONOP V. HAWAIIAN AIRLINES CASE WHERE A 22 SHAM LOG-IN AND PASSWORD, ON AN EMAIL ADDRESS AND CREDIT CARD, 23 THAT'S NOT GOOD ENOUGH FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION. IF ANYBODY IN 2.4 THE GENERAL PUBLIC CAN CREATE AN ACCOUNT, IT'S JUST AS GOOD AS 25 BEING BROADCAST TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THIS IS WHAT I -- THIS IS WHAT I WANT TO DO, BECAUSE I WANT TO DECIDE THIS ON ACTUAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS, AS OPPOSED TO A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE, THEN I CAN (INDISCERNIBLE) AND THEN I CAN WRITE SOMETHING AND REALLY FIGURE IT OUT. SO I'M GOING TO -- I DON'T KNOW. I'LL LOOK AT IT. WANT YOU TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT. SO I'M GOING TO DISMISS IT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AND I WANT YOU TO ACTUALLY MAKE ALLEGATIONS AND NOT JUST OUOTE FROM A NEWSPAPER. IT'S OKAY THAT YOU RELY ON IT, BUT ACTUALLY DO SOMETHING AND TRY TO FIT THEM WITHIN. MR. BURTON: UNDERSTOOD, BUT I'M NOT SURE WHERE THE DEFECT WOULD BE IN THE CIPA CAUSE OF ACTION. THE COURT: I'M JUST TELLING YOU I'M HAVING YOU AMEND I'M GOING TO WRITE SOMETHING. I'M GOING TO DO IT ALL AT ONCE, AND I'LL FIGURE IT OUT, BECAUSE I DON'T EVEN QUITE KNOW -- I MEAN, WE'VE HAD A LOT OF ARGUMENT AND STUFF, BUT NONE OF IT IS IN THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT IS JUST A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE. SO IF I'M GOING TO DENY A MOTION TO DISMISS, I'M GOING TO BASE IT ON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND NOT BASED ON A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE. ALL RIGHT? SO I'M GOING TO DO IT ALL AT ONCE. MR. BURTON: I JUST WANT TO POINT YOUR ATTENTION, WE

DID INCLUDE IN OUR BRIEFING, BUT FROM THE NINTH CIRCUIT, THE

1	THE COURT: COIN.
2	MR. OOT: NOT (INDISCERNIBLE). BUT I CAN TELL YOU
3	UNDER MY OBLIGATION TO THE COURT THAT INFORMATION IS PRESERVED.
4	LITIGATION (INDISCERNIBLE) NOTICE HAVE BEEN SENT OUT. NO
5	INFORMATION IS BEING DESTROYED.
6	MR. BURTON: AND THEY'VE TOLD US THAT ORALLY, YOUR
7	HONOR, BUT THIS IS THE PROBLEM: WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO GET
8	THEM TO ACTUALLY PUT IN WRITING WHAT THEY'RE ACTUALLY DOING TO
9	PRESERVE THAT INFORMATION. WE PROPOSED AN ACTUAL PRESERVATION
10	ORDER (INDISCERNIBLE) THAT WE'D LIKE ENTERED, AND THEY DIDN'T
11	WANT TO ENGAGE IN
12	THE COURT: YOU MEAN ENTERED AS AN ORDER? WE DON'T
13	NORMALLY REQUIRE THAT. HE JUST SAID AS AN OFFICER OF THE
14	COURT, HE REPRESENTED IN OPEN THE COURT, TO ME, THAT IT'S BEING
15	PRESERVED. I WOULD GO BACK AND CHECK AGAIN. IF IT TURNS OUT,
16	CASE GOES FORWARD AND NONE OF THAT STUFF IS PRESERVED, WELL,
17	NOW YOU'VE GOT A REAL ADVERSE INFERENCE, AND SPOLIATION SET UP
18	REALLY WELL.
19	MR. BURTON: THERE'S A LOT OF STEPS BETWEEN THE
20	TWO
21	THE COURT: YEAH, I KNOW.
22	MR. BURTON: BECAUSE THERE'S VERY SPECIFIC THINGS
23	THAT WE WANT THEM TO DO IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE INFORMATION.
24	THE COURT: YOU DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT THEY DO, SO I
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YOU COULDN'T EVEN TELL ME HOW IT WORKS. THEY KNOW HOW IT 1 WORKS. I'M ASSUMING THAT THEY KNOW HOW TO GO THROUGH AND 2 3 PRESERVE IT, LIKE ANY ROUTINE DESTRUCTION HAS ALL BEEN TURNED OFF. ALL THAT KIND OF STUFF. I KNOW, I KNOW. I KNOW WITH 4 5 THIS COMPANY -- I KNOW WITH (INDISCERNIBLE). I KNOW THERE'S 6 AUTOMATIC DESTRUCTION THAT GOES ON. I'M ASSUMING IT'S ALL BEEN 7 TURNED OFF. 8 MR. OOT: THAT'S NOT HAPPENING, YOUR HONOR, 9 (INDISCERNIBLE). 10 THE COURT: DOUBLE NEGATIVER THERE. IT'S ALL 11 HAPPENING. 12 MR. BURTON: YOUR HONOR, IT'S STILL AN ISSUE FOR US THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS DURING THE CMC. 13 14 THE COURT: WHY? BUT WHAT BASIS DO YOU HAVE, BECAUSE 15 I TELL YOU I DO A LOT OF CASES, AND I NORMALLY DON'T ENTER A 16 PRESERVATION ORDER. NORMALLY, WHEN COUNSEL REPRESENTS THEY'VE 17 DONE THAT, THAT'S GOOD ENOUGH. SO TELL ME WHAT LEADS YOU TO BELIEVE IT'S NOT GOOD ENOUGH HERE. 18 19 MR. BURTON: BECAUSE THERE'S SPECIFIC THINGS WE WANT 20 DONE IN ORDER TO PRESERVE INFORMATION AND WE NEED TO HAVE THAT 21 ASSURANCE THAT --22 THE COURT: OKAY. LIKE WHAT? 23 MR. BURTON: I'M SORRY. I'M NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS 24 ALL THE TECHNICAL THINGS THAT WE LISTED IN OUR PROTECTIVE 25 ORDER, YOU KNOW. THIS IS WHAT WE'RE PREPARING FOR THE CMC.

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BUT, OBVIOUSLY, THIS IS A CASE WHERE WE DON'T EXACTLY KNOW, NOT ONLY WHAT THEY WERE DOING TO PRESERVE DOCUMENTS, BUT HOW EXACTLY THEY WERE DOING THIS PROGRAM. THEY'VE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY WERE DOING THE PROGRAM. THE COURT: YES. MR. BURTON: OKAY. AND WE'D LIKE TO START MOVING ON DISCOVERY --THE COURT: NO, WE'RE NOT GOING TO MOVE ON THAT UNTIL WE GET PAST THE PLEADING STAGE. SO THAT'S FINE. BUT I -- SO THAT'S A DIFFERENT ARGUMENT ABOUT PRESERVATION. WHAT I WANT TO KNOW IS WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE REPRESENTATION THAT THE PRESERVING EVERYTHING ISN'T GOOD ENOUGH. MR. BURTON: BECAUSE THEY WON'T TELL US EXACTLY WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO PRESERVE THINGS. WE'VE ASKED THEM TO PUT IN WRITING, OKAY, WHAT INFORMATION IS BEING PRESERVED EXACTLY, HOW DID YOU TAKE STEPS TO PRESERVE THAT INFORMATION, AND WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT IS. MR. OOT: AND I'VE GIVEN HIM ASSURANCES THAT I CONDUCTED A REASONABLE INQUIRY UNDER 26(G). EVERYTHING IS BEING PRESERVED, YOUR HONOR. TO SORT OF MOVE INTO THIS DISCOVERY PHASE IS I THINK A VIOLATION OF TWOMBLY IQBAL. YOU KNOW, I'M HAPPY TO MAKE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES --THE COURT: THAT'S NOT QUITE TRUE. IT'S NOT A PSLRA CASE. THERE'S NOT -- THERE'S NO STAY HERE. NONETHELESS, I DO

1	THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE HERE THAT WE GET PAST THE PLEADING
2	STAGE.
3	MR. OOT: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
4	THE COURT: BEFORE THEN.
5	ALL RIGHT. I DON'T THINK WE NEED CMC. THEY
6	REPRESENTED THAT IT'S BEING PRESERVED. IT'S EXPERIENCED
7	COUNSEL. IT'S AN EXPERIENCED COMPANY. THEY'RE WELL AWARE OF
8	THEIR OBLIGATIONS. IF I HAVE TO EAT MY HAT, THEY'LL PAY.
9	ALL RIGHT. I'M SURE I'LL SEE YOU BACK IN A COUPLE
10	MONTHS. THANK YOU.
11	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 9:48 A.M.)
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1 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER 2 3 I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT 4 TRANSCRIPT, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, OF THE ABOVE PAGES OF 5 THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING PROVIDED TO ME BY THE 6 U.S. DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OF THE 7 PROCEEDINGS TAKEN ON THE DATE AND TIME PREVIOUSLY STATED IN THE ABOVE MATTER. 8 9 I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NEITHER COUNSEL FOR, RELATED TO, NOR EMPLOYED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION IN 10 11 WHICH THIS HEARING WAS TAKEN; AND, FURTHER, THAT I AM NOT FINANCIALLY NOR OTHERWISE INTERESTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THE 12 1.3 ACTION. 14 15 16 17 SEPTEMBER 8, 2017 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25